structure of the dialogues. My own sense is that it is impossible to understand or appreciate either element in the project of ancient philosophy. I am as dissatisfied with approaches that ignore the ethical goals of the dialogues as I am dispirited by efforts to show that the arguments are of no significance and even designed to mislead their audience into a "shallow" understanding of Plato's real purpose. Argument may not be philosophy's exclusive concern but the sort of investigation they involve is essential to its purpose.
3. Michel Foucault says in his lectures at the Collège de France, 1982 France, -1983 (The Government of Self and Others) that "philosophy finds its reality in the practice of philosophy understood as the set of practices through which the subject has a relationship to itself, elaborates itself, and works on itself. The work of the self on self -that is the reality of philosophy." Late Foucault as we know perceives philosophy as askēsis, and he tries to transfer very Ancient concept of philosophizing to his own work (as it is noted by Paul Veyne). Surprisingly (surely for some rigorous Platonists) Foucault reads Plato by this way when he interprets his comprehension of pragmata. Do you think that we can read Plato's dialogues as instigation to the permanent labor of the self on itself without endeavor to confirm the truth of being generally valid and normative for all reasonable individuals?
<A. Nehamas> Michel Foucault was a great reader of Plato. In my opinion, however, he overemphasized an individualist account of Plato's philosophy. I suspect that such an individualist account is a possible interpretation of his Socratic dialogues but not of works like the Phaedo, the Republic, or the Laws. In these works, Plato, I believe, is engaged in a much vaster, socially situation, project. Still, Foucault's reading of the Platonic Socrates is exciting, productive, and inspiring. 4. One of your favorite philosophers, Friedrich Nietzsche is not very friendly to Socrates in his writings. On the other hand Socrates is important example of how to live an examined life for Ancients similarly as Nietzsche is important figure for contemporary intellectuals. Tension between Socrates and Nietzsche follows maybe from differences between Ancient and Modern worlds. Do you think that Nietzsche is more important figure for our speculations about philosophical life than Socrates (interpreted by contemporary philosophers)? What can we learn from Nietzsche about living as an art? Of course if we are aware of the art of living as an ability to become different which cannot be taught at the end.
<A. Nehamas> Nietzsche's attitude toward Socrates goes through several changes: an early period of passionate attacks (mainly in The Birth of Tragedy) is followed by a truce in works Paulo, v.9, n.1. p. 141-145, 2015 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 rejecting him or accepting him wholly. Socrates was for Nietzsche, as he makes clear in Beyond Good and Evil, a "genuine philosopher" and a true individual, but his message, as he reads him through dialogues like the Republic, was addressed and intended to be binding on everyone. Nietzsche could not come to terms with these two aspects of Socrates' personality and influence-he was both too close to and too far from him. Not to mention the fact that Socrates, who wrote nothing, was immortalized by the greatest philosopher of all time, while Nietzsche himself, who wrote without end, could find, while he was alive at least, no readers, and had to be Plato to his own Socrates and Socrates to his own Plato-both author and character-at the same time. <A. Nehamas> I don't think that the art of living is essentially individualist. I tend to distinguish three versions. One we find in Plato's Socratic dialogues, in which Socrates seems to urge that everyone follow his lead and practice "the care of the self" but has no method from proving that they should do so. A second is in Plato's Republic and the dialogues surrounding them. Here, Plato seems to believe that he does have the right considerations to convince everyone that the care of the self, now codified as the training of the philosopher-kings and the rest of his educational system is best for all. And a third, which I am eager to defend, is the approach of philosophers like Montaigne and Nietzsche, who believe that there is no single way of living well and no method for convincing everyone that they should make an effort to do so, if they are not so inclined. Taking the metaphor of art seriously, no one has an obligation to be an artist-and certainly not to obligation to be a good one. 6. One of the main themes of late Foucault is the care of the self he studies in the texts written by Greco-Roman philosophers. Foucault's death made impossible to continue his study of contemporary meaning of the care of the self. What do you think about the possibility of the care of the self of the subjects living in modern societies in comparison with the work on the self of ancient intellectuals?
<A. Nehamas> I am afraid we don't know enough to make such a direct comparison. One difference is that I am not convinced, as the ancient philosophers were, that philosophy is the only way of leading a good human life. We also don't share the ancients' disdain for manual São Paulo, v.9, n.1. p. 141-145, 2015 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 and productive labor (the life of the baunasoi) so that modes of life that the ancients would have excluded implicitly from the art of living can now be included among the ways in which human beings can lead lives of worth and accomplishment. Conversely, the professionalization of philosophy has reduced its role from the central, indeed unique position to which they ancient had elevated their practice. There is all the difference in the world between a ancient School and a modern Department of philosophy.
7. What does it mean for philosophical thought if we say that to think philosophically is to live philosophically? Do you think the philosophical thought cannot be separated from the life of the philosopher? What is the sense of such areas of inquiry as epistemology or logic?
<A. Nehamas> There have always been aspects of philosophy that are not directly linked to its practical interests, though they may have implications about them. Much of science, in fact, has begun as philosophy. Consider physics, from the Presocratics to Aristotle, and its present place in the center of the natural sciences. Consider psychology, which was not sepa- A main difference between these two is that whereas moral values, impartial as they are, demand that they be obeyed, aesthetic values do not. As I said, no one has the obligation to be an artist, much less a good one. Which is
